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calcu-
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late, for example, that if a creature C has moved a certain distance at a
certain speed relative to creature D and if creature D is now at place P,
then creature C will be found at place P*. Spatial thought depends on a
grasp of the fact that spatial relations between places will stay constant
even though the spatial relations between objects vary, because a significant
component of it uses those constant spatial relations as a means of
mapping and keeping track of the changing spatial relations. Consequently,
any understanding of the nature of space must respect the distinction
between these two different systems of spatial relations. Moreover,
this distinction also seems to be integral to the notion of a nonconceptual
point of view. Possessing a nonconceptual point of view on the world
involves being aware that one is taking a particular route through spacetime
as one navigates that route, and an adequate awareness that one is
taking a particular route through space-time clearly presupposes a degree
of understanding of the nature of space.
Obviously, though, the account of place recognition in the previous
chapter does not respect this distinction, or more cautiously, the demands
placed upon place recognition could be satisfied by a creature with no
inkling of the distinction. It is perfectly possible for a creature to be capable
of recognizing features as features that it has seen before and to put
these recognitional abilities to work in navigating from one feature to
another, without apprehending that there are spatial relations holding between
the places at which those features are instantiated and that those
spatial relations hold independently of the spatial relations between the
features. Place recognition in the minimal sense discussed in the previous
chapter can exist without an understanding of space. Such minimal place
recognition involves the recognition of things that are places but does not
demand that they be recognised as places. This indicates one dimension
along which my minimal account of place recognition needs to be developed
if it is to be built up into the notion of a nonconceptual point
of view.
There is a second, related limitation in the minimal account of place
recognition. The exercise of conscious memory in the recognition of
places reflects a sense of the nonsolipsistic distinction between experience
and what is experienced, but I have said nothing about the functions that
this serves within the life of any creature capable of it. We are trying to
Navigation and Spatial Reasoning 195
capture the basic degree of self-consciousness implicated in a creature’s
having a point of view or perspective on the world, and it is reasonable
to expect that this degree of self-consciousness will be implicated across
a broad spectrum of cognitive and practical abilities. There seem to be
three important questions at issue here, none of which has yet been discussed.
First, what part does this nonsolipsistic distinction play within
cognitive and practical life more widely construed? Second, what further
cognitive and practical abilities are made available by the possibility of
conscious place recognition? Third, what is the relevance of any of these
cognitive and practical abilities to the possession of a nonconceptual
point of view on the world and to primitive self-consciousness in general?
There are, then, two dimensions along which I am obligated to develop
the minimal account of place recognition, and there are good reasons to
think that the concept of navigation will be centrally implicated in both
of them. Different types of navigation involve different levels of spatial
awareness, with correspondingly different modes of understanding
places. It is highly plausible that the move from the minimal grasp of place
already in play to the fuller spatial understanding implicated in the notion
of a nonconceptual point of view can be profitably analysed as a move
from one form of navigational competence to another. Thus the concept
of navigation seems very helpful in fulfilling the first obligation. Moreover,
the ability to navigate through a spatial environment is itself at the
intersection of a range of other cognitive and practical abilities, and hence
seems equally promising with respect to my second obligation.
In the following sections of this chapter I will be primarily concerned
with substantiating this general idea that careful attention to different
types of navigational ability will help to bridge the theoretical gap between
minimal place recognition and full-fledged possession of a nonconceptual
point of view. Before moving on to this, however, it is important
clearly to articulate the different elements that have emerged in my discussion
of the notion of a nonconceptual point of view so that we can be
clear about the end point to which we are moving.
The most general characterization of the notion of a nonconceptual
point of view is this: having a nonconceptual point of view on the world
involves being aware that one is taking a particular route through spacetime
as one navigates that route. But what exactly does this entail? A
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minimal requirement upon any creature to whom a nonconceptual point
of view can correctly be ascribed is that it be capable of registering the
distinction between experience and the experienced. This is the nonsolipsistic
requirement that, as I argued in the previous chapter, can be satisfied
only by forms of experience that do not take place wholly within a continuous
present. The temporal implications of the nonsolipsistic requirement
arise because grasping that an object of experience has an existence transcending
the particular occasion on which it is experienced implies grasping
that what is being experienced at a particular time has either existed
in the past or will exist in the future. The possession of recognitional
abilities involving conscious memory provides the most basic way in
which the nonsolipsistic requirement can be satisfied, and I suggested that
the recognition of places in terms of features is the most basic such recognitional
ability.
In addition to this nonsolipsistic dimension of the notion of a nonconceptual
point of view, there is a second dimension. A nonconceptual point
of view requires awareness that one is taking a particular route through
space-time, and this brings with it the need for a degree of spatial awareness.
Recognizing places places cannot take place in isolation or purely
passively; it goes hand in hand with navigating from one place to another.
The navigational capacities that this involves will be a crucial element in
possessing a nonconceptual point of view on the world. When the particular
route through space-time that a creature takes is determined by its
navigational abilities, its awareness of that route (demanded by its possession
of a nonconceptual point of view) will have to reflect the fact that it
is navigating through the world. This in turn demands a degree of understanding
of the nature of space. In particular, it demands an understanding
of the distinction between the spatial relations that hold between
things and the spatial relations that hold between places.
Let me then provisionally break down the notion of a nonconceptual
point of view into the following constituent elements:
The nonsolipsistic component (the distinction between experience and
what that experience is experience of) requires
a. grasping that an object of experience exists independently of a particular
apprehension of it, which requires