it is not possible to give a determinate answer to the question of whether

which)
242 Chapter 9
it is not possible to give a determinate answer to the question of whether
or not they qualify as psychological subjects. This is an unsurprising consequence
of the point made in the previous paragraph about the category
of psychological subjects being a complex sortal category. Given the complexity
and diversity of the criteria of identity and application, the different
combinations in which they may appear, and the fact that it will not
always be straightforward to determine whether a given criterion actually
applies, it is unsurprising that there does not appear to be a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions that will settle in any given case whether
one is dealing with a psychological subject or not. Nor should this be a
matter of great concern, since it is not clear that there are any philosophically
interesting kinds or sorts that are completely determinate. As far
as analyzing distinguishing psychological self-awareness is concerned, the
vagueness of the category of a psychological subject means simply that
we should concern ourselves with trying to identify the core of the notion
of a psychological subject. By the core of the notion of a psychological
subject, I mean a set of basic psychological categories whose instantiation
by a given individual collectively provides strong prima facie evidence that
the individual in question is a psychological subject, where the instantiation
of those categories counts as strong prima facie evidence for the presence
of f if and only if a judgement based on such evidence would count
as warranted. One might define a warranted judgement in this context as
a judgement that would often settle a debate as to the presence of f and
would at the minimum be taken very seriously in such a debate.8
The account of the notion of a self-aware psychological subject I am
looking for will take the following form:
(PS1) Self-aware psychological subjects are aware of themselves as x, y,
z, etc.
The schematic letters correspond to the basic psychological categories
that collectively count as prima facie evidence for the presence of a psychological
subject. Of course, there are indefinitely many psychological
categories whose instantiation provides strong prima facie evidence for
the presence of a psychological subject. The category of individuals capable
of autobiographical memory seems to qualify, for example. This
poses an obvious problem. How is one to identify what I am terming the
core of the notion of a psychological subject? How is one to distinguish
Psychological Self-Awareness: Self and Others 243
the basic from the nonbasic among all the psychological categories whose
instantiation provides strong prima facie evidence for the presence of a
psychological subject?
The solution to this puzzle is to distinguish between those psychological
categories that one cannot hold to be instantiated without assuming
that they are instantiated in a psychological subject and those psychological
categories that can be ascribed to an individual without thereby
identifying that individual as a psychological subject. To ascribe autobiographical
memories to an individual is ipso facto to identify that individual
as a psychological subject. So the inference from an individual’s
possession of autobiographical memories to that individual’s being a psychological
subject seems somewhat analytic (as would be the inference
from an individual’s being a milkman to his being a man). On the other
hand, one can decide that a creature is sentient (that is to say, capable of
feeling pleasure and pain) without ipso facto placing it in the category of
psychological subjects. Sentience is not a sufficient condition for psychological-
subjecthood. So a creature’s sentience can count as one of a range
of facts that collectively count as strong prima facie evidence for psychological
subjecthood. I thus assume that the psychological categories that
feature in a completed version of (PS1) will not individually count as sufficient
conditions for psychological subjecthood.
Perhaps the most obvious candidate for inclusion in a completed version
of (PS1) that satisfies the requirement just noted will be the psychological
category of perceivers of the world. This follows straightforwardly
from the fact that perceiving the world in at least one modality is a necessary
condition for being ascribed any psychological properties at all,
and only creatures to which psychological properties can be ascribed can
count as psychological subjects. So, to be aware of oneself as a psychological
subject must involve being aware of oneself as a perceiver. It is helpful
at this point, I think, to advert back to Gareth Evans’ idea of a simple
theory of perception, briefly discussed toward the end of the previous
chapter. Here is what he says:
Any thinker who has an idea of an objective spatial world—an idea of a world
of objects and phenomena which can be perceived but which are not dependent
upon being perceived for their existence—must be able to think of his perception
of the world as being simultaneously due to his position in the world, and to the
condition of the world at that position. The very idea of a perceivable, objective
244 Chapter 9
spatial world brings with it the idea of the subject as being in the world, with the
course of his perceptions due to his changing position in the world and to the
more or less stable way the world is. (Evans 1982, 222)
The significance of a subject’s mastery of the sort of simple theory of
perception that Evans outlines does not lie solely in what it betokens for
his command of the objectivity of the spatial environment.9 It is also
highly relevant to his psychological self-awareness. To have mastered a
simple theory of perception is quite simply to be aware of oneself as a
perceiver of the environment.
Perception, obviously, is necessary but not sufficient for being a psychological
subject. The category of psychological subjects is much narrower
than the category of perceivers, and the category of psychologically
self-aware subjects is correspondingly much narrower than the category
of self-aware perceivers. It is a shortcoming in Evans’s discussion of simple
theories of perception that he gives the impression that mastery of such a
theory is somehow the key to self-awareness. The truth of the matter is
that a subject’s awareness of himself as a perceiver of the environment
is just one of the several strands in psychological self-awareness. John
Campbell’s recent book (1994), which follows Evans in many respects,
develops Evans’s position at this crucial point. Campbell stresses that we
need to think in terms, not just of a theory of perception, but of a joint
theory of perception and action. This broaches what I take to be the second
strand in the notion of a psychological subject. Psychological subjects
are agents who intentionally act upon the world because of their perceptions
and desires. Correspondingly, to be aware of oneself as a psychological
subject is to be aware of oneself as an agent.10 The psychological
category of agents itself has several strands, one of which emerges in this
passage from John Campbell: “This theory explains our perceptions as
the joint upshot of the way things are in the world and the way things are
with us, and it explains the effects of our actions as the joint consequences
of our bodily movements and the way things were around us to begin
with” (Campbell 1994, 217). As it stands, however, this is rather incomplete.
A subject’s actions are not just the joint consequences of bodily
movements and the layout of the environment. A subject’s bodily movements
are what they are because of his intentions, and an action is successful
or unsuccessful to the extent that those intentions are satisfied.
Lack of success can be due to the particular body movements made not