The fact remains, however, that the descriptions and explanations

what
Solving the Paradox of Self-Consciousness 285
their mothers intended them to. And this implicates an embedding of a
first-person content within a first-order iteration.
The fact remains, however, that the descriptions and explanations given
of the various examples of joint visual attention, coordinated joint engagement,
and social referencing that I have considered do not provide
any examples of second or higher-order iterations. They are all forms of
cognition and action for which inference to the best explanation can rest
satisfied with first-order iterations. Nonetheless, it is possible to describe
a consistent and indeed familiar situation for which inference to the best
explanation does appear to require attributing a second-order iteration,
and indeed, a second-order iteration that embeds a first-person content.
This can be done by varying slightly one of the examples of coordinated
joint engagement already discussed. Trevarthen and Hubley’s longitudinal
study of Tracey describes a game with a trolley:
When her mother showed her how to make the wheels of the inverted trolley turn
and squeak, Tracey watched closely and touched the wheels. When her mother
eagerly said “Pull it” Tracey made a move to draw the trolley towards her, but
failed because the string was not taut, at the same time, expecting success, she
looked up and smiled eagerly at her mother. (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978, 204)
Explaining Tracey’s pleasure in this simple game requires attributing to
her the following two true protobeliefs:
(3) Tracey recognizes, “I have succeeded in what I set out to do.”
(4) Tracey recognizes, “Mother recognizes that I have succeeded in
what I set out to do.”
I am assuming that Tracey’s expectant smile toward her mother anticipates
a reciprocating smile. Suppose, however, another situation in which
things are similar except that no such reciprocating smile appears on the
mother’s face. Tracey* (as I shall call her) is consequently distressed. One
way of explaining this state of affairs would be in terms of Tracey*’s recognizing
her mother’s failure to recognize her intention that her mother
should recognize her success. This in turn requires attributing to Tracey*
the intention to get her mother to take pleasure when she succeeds in
carrying out her intention:
(5) Tracey* intends, “Mother is pleased when she recognizes that I
have succeeded in what I set out to do.”
286 Chapter 10
This is a second-order iteration, and moreover a second-order iteration
that embeds a first-person content.
It should not be thought that describing such a possible scenario is
simply stipulating a solution to the problem, because the possibility of
the scenario as described presupposes the coherence of ascribing secondorder
iterations at the nonconceptual level. Certainly, there would be
room for considerable disquiet if the only motivation for believing in the
possibility of the scenario was to solve the problem at hand. But this is
surely not the case. Not only is the sort of interaction between infant and
mother described readily conceivable and indeed familiar, but the explanation
proposed can be tested. Suppose, for example, that one is wondering
whether Tracey*’s distress ought not to be explained more simply in
terms of her being unhappy that her mother had failed to smile when a
certain effect was attained. This would, of course, require no more than
the following uniterated intention:
(6) Tracey* intends, “Mother is pleased when such and such occurs.”
Now it seems to me that what is at issue between these two interpretations
can be empirically tested, because they each implicate different
counterfactuals. Suppose that the relevant effect is the moving of the trolley.
If the explanation implicating the uniterated intention (6) is correct,
then one would expect Tracey* to be distressed whenever the trolley
moves and her mother does not smile or otherwise show pleasure. If, on
the other hand, the explanation implicating the second-order iteration in
intention (5) is correct, then one would expect Tracey* to show distress
only in those situations where her mother fails to show pleasure and the
movement of the trolley is contingent upon Tracey*’s pulling it. There is
nothing puzzling about the thought that this counterfactual might be true
rather than the previous one, and hence there must be a genuine and psychologically
real distinction between (5) and (6).
I take it, therefore, that clause (b) in the tripartite communicative intent
governing the deployment of the first-person pronoun is fully specifiable
at the nonconceptual level. That leaves us simply with clause (c) in the
tripartite intention, the clause specifying the so-called Gricean mechanism
that the intention specified in clause (b) should be part of the explanation
for the success of the intention specified in clause (a). Here again
are the conditions we are working with:
Solving the Paradox of Self-Consciousness 287
An utterer u utters ‘I’ to refer to himself* if and only if u utters ‘I’ in full
comprehension of the token-reflexive rule that tokens of ‘I’ refer to their
producer and with the tripartite intention
a. that some audience a should have their attention drawn to him*,
b. that a should be aware of his* intention that a’s attention should be
drawn to him*,
c. that the awareness mentioned in (b) should be part of the explanation
for a’s attention being drawn to him*.
The first point to make here is that the iteration involved in clause (c) is
not at a higher level than the iteration involved in clause (b). It is not that
(a) is embedded in (b). Rather, the content of the intention in (c) is that
there be a certain relation between (a) and (b). What is this relation? In
Gricean accounts of meaning, the relation is often glossed in terms of the
awareness mentioned in (b) being a reason for the success of the intention
in (a). This does not seem appropriate, however, since the notion of a
reason is not operative at the level of nonconceptual content.3 What is
needed is a nonconceptual analog of the reason-giving interpretation of
the Gricean mechanism. Some form of causal interpretation is the obvious
alternative. Suppose that we reformulate (c) as follows:
c9. that the awareness in (b) should bring it about that a’s attention be
drawn to him*
Now since (b) has already been explained and since the intention that a’s
attention be drawn to him* is the content of (a), which has also already
been explained, the only new element to be explained here is the causal
relation of bringing-it-about-that and how it can form part of an intention
linking (a) and (b). There is a reason for referring to the causal relation
of bringing-of-about-that, rather than to the notion of cause. The
concept of cause brings with it a degree of theory that does not seem to
be required to manipulate the Gricean mechanism. For example, the concept
of cause has clear modal elements with respect to the necessary connection
between cause and effect and the concomitant impossibility of
the cause not being followed by the relevant effect. These modal elements
are not required for the Gricean mechanism to be understood and employed.
Consequently, the concept of cause need not feature in the content
of the communicative intention defining mastery of the first-person pronoun.
The notion of bringing-it-about-that is intended to indicate a